The bungling began with President Arroyo. She had an incoherent policy, sending mixed signals to the negotiating panel.

Let’s, for a moment, separate conspiracy theories from the events surrounding the ancestral domain agreement between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.

As early as November 2006, both parties had already agreed on the core principle of "right to self-determination." This included broad concepts of control over resources, a form of governance, and territory—all what we’re seeing now in the memorandum of agreement or MOA.

At that time, it was Silvestre Afable who led the Philippine negotiating panel. He had the confidence of President Arroyo who, we learned, was substantially briefed on the talks. But Afable resigned in June 2007 reportedly because of "lack of support" from Malacanang. He has neither confirmed nor denied this.

When his successor, retired General Rodolfo Garcia, took over and briefed President Arroyo and members of the Cabinet cluster committee on security on the status of the talks, basically presenting what Afable had already told the President, he was in for a surprise. Members of the committee objected to some of the right-to-self determination issues.

The President, an official present at the meeting said, kept asking if the panel had consulted with local officials whose areas, or parts of these, will be part of the proposed Bangsamoro Juridical Entity or BJE. The official said it was as if President Arroyo was hearing the presentation for the first time.

Clearly, the bungling began with the President. This shows that President Arroyo had an incoherent policy, sending mixed signals to her negotiating panel.

No strategic communication

Then, in August 2007, in what appeared to be a turnaround, she called for a "pilot implementation of the envisioned Muslim ancestral domain regime." This was after skirmishes between the Marines and MILF took place in Basilan, claiming the lives of Marine soldiers, who were eventually beheaded.

Since then, talks resumed on an on-again, off-again basis. In between these ups and downs, Malaysia threatened to pull out as facilitator, impatient with the slow progress. But it never did.

Parallel to the talks, various foreign governments poured aid and technical assistance to Mindanao, led by Japan, US and Australia. But Japan went a step further: it set up office in Cotabato and participated in the International Monitoring Team (IMT), particularly to watch over development projects they were funding.

Early this year, the President ordered a legal review of the MOA. The process took about two months during which Jesuit priest and Constitution expert Joaquin Bernas was consulted. But he wasn’t part of the review team.

During this period, the negotiating panel did not conduct consultations with policy-makers, senators, congressmen, and local officials. This is where the President’s second bungling comes in. She did not order full-scale talks with her political allies nor did she campaign for this MOA.

Moreover, there was no strategic thinking going on in terms of communicating the MOA to interested parties.

GMA postpones problems

After the review, the legal team reportedly sent a memo to the President, identifying which of the MOA provisions can be implemented by the executive department, those which need amendments to the Constitution, and those which need enabling laws from Congress.

The MOA provides for a two-step process. First, a plebiscite will be held in the villages that are going to be included in an expanded autonomous region—but this would take place one year after the signing of the MOA. It was up to these communities whether they wanted to be in our out.

Second, informal talks for the final compact, meaning the overall peace agreement, were to start after the signing and should be concluded in 15 months, or about late 2009 or even later. The MOA, therefore, was not immediately effective because some provisions had to pass through Congress while others required changes in the Constitution.

Still, some observers are surprised that the President seemed to suddenly push the MOA. This perception is brought about by the fact that there were no extensive and frequent meetings to consult with various parties.

Others link the MOA to what they say is the President’s desire to amend the Constitution and extend her term beyond 2010.

What they miss is this: President Arroyo may, in fact, be postponing the problems that will come about because of the MOA to the next president. After all, there’s still a final compact to negotiate—and because of the President’s fragile political capital, we’re not even sure that this will come about during her term.

Moreover, the implementation of the MOA is dependent on legislation and Constitutional amendments. Both processes take time. And because of our past experience with people’s initiative, the opposition-dominated Senate is bound to kill any moves to change the Constitution through a constituent assembly.

Pressure points

Last month, both parties were ready to sign the MOA. There were pressure points on both sides. The Malaysian-led IMT was due to end its term in August. And the MOA would have been an accomplishment worth mentioning in President Arroyo’s State of the Nation address scheduled late July.

On the part of the MILF, they had internal expectations to manage.

But this didn’t come to pass. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, stopped the signing, through a temporary restraining order. This time, the justices who usually vote in favor of Malacanang on key issues, didn’t side with the President.

We learned that Malacanang did not send signals to these justices to vote against the TRO. The message that the President may be sending to the MILF, Malaysia and other foreign governments, and the public is this: She has done her part; the ball is now with the High Court.

Tomorrow (Aug. 15), the Supreme Court will hold its oral argument on the substantive aspects of the MOA amid a backdrop of anti-Muslim prejudice and threats of war. It is hoped that the Court start a dispassionate public scrutiny of the MOA—away from the noisy grandstanding of politicians, unfounded fears, and conspiracy theories. (abs-cbnNEWS.com/Newsbreak)

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